Obstacles to Learning
"Learning does not always lead to veridical knowledge. (…) Entities can incorrectly learn, and they can correctly learn that which is incorrect." (Huber, 1991, p. 89, emphasis added) There are a series of circumstances and individual and organizational behaviors that act as learning inhibitors or are the cause of certain learning disabilities. The result is that the process of learning itself may become flawed or what has been learned is not really useful for the organization or is even counterproductive. Making use of several experts' insights, we will explore all these mechanisms, whose destructive power is often all the greater for being unnoticed.
Shortcomings in Learning Conditions
For learning to happen, organizations and their members must comply with certain conditions. These characteristics may refer to learners and also to the environment. Learners may lack the right competences or abilities, motivational aspects may have been neglected, and the environment both internal and external to the organization may be hostile to learning.
Deficiencies in Learners
First of all, lack of attention or heed-mostly because of ingrained routines-may lead to overlooking new opportunities, ignoring danger signals or not detecting lessons from past experience. Often this phenomenon has become structural when the whole organization has adopted a generalized single-loop learning style (Argyris, 1976) . This means that root causes are never examined and basic assumptions and principles are never questioned in the face of new events. On other occasions, even if emerging new knowledge is acknowledged, the organization or individuals may lack absorptive capacity, i.e. the ability to assimilate and make good use of this knowledge. Other capacities that may be flawed are organizational memory or knowledge repositories (which may be insufficient, biased, overloaded, disorganized, or obsolete), and social competences. Regarding the latter, many problems in learning processes come from troubled social relationships within the organization or among key individuals. Finally, sometimes it is the receptivity to corrective feedback that is lacking.
A different group of conditions are goals and expectations. Learning aims at success, but defining success in each case is not easy, because it depends on what criteria are applied and by whom. What is considered success here and now may not be considered success in the future, or in other parts of the organization. On the other hand, a high level of expectation leads to a learning cycle; the contrary is a vicious cycle of low expectation-low investment in exploration.
Goals and expectations are closely related with motivational issues such as self-efficacy, empowerment, and incentives to share information. Self-efficacy is the belief in one's power to achieve certain goals. If it is insufficient (i.e., a feeling of powerlessness) or excessive (i.e. overconfidence), this distorted self-view has an effect on the amount of effort invested, the orientation of decisions (e.g., conservative or risky), and subsequent learning processes. And this mechanism works both at the individual and collective level. Support by superiors, real decision power, and the establishment of objective measures of actual capabilities are indispensable for avoiding these problems.
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In learners: 
A Difficult Environment
Environmental conditions are crucial for learning to happen. And here we are referring to the organization's external and internal environment.
An entrepreneurial outlook entails a proactive attitude that makes a difference in the way a firm faces the challenges posed by its external environment. This means, first of all, that the environment -i.e. market conditions, technology, and social and political situation -does indeed influence how firms learn and behave.
The first characteristic we could examine is the level of turbulence within the environment. By 'turbulence' we mean rapid changes, along with a high level of uncertainty. There is a general agreement among experts that an excessively turbulent environment or too much calm is harmful for organizational learning. In the former case, if turbulence is excessive, the organizational system becomes overloaded (a manager ironically talked about a "target-rich environment"), and it loses the ability to orientate or map the situation. Too much turbulence produces a stress that may paralyze potential learners. It takes time for organizations in this situation to start learning from it. In the latter case, outcomes become highly predictable, the organization becomes trapped in its own success (the "competence trap") and increasingly dependent on well-trodden paths, underinvests in innovation, and finally finds itself unable to respond to new challenges. Therefore, a certain tolerable level of turbulence may be beneficial. Where the limits of this balance lie depends on the organization's tolerance threshold. The key is the firm's capacity to reflect on its own learning conditions (i.e. capacity for meta-learning). This is the reason why authors such as Nonaka (1994) distinguish between "creative chaos" and "destructive chaos". In other words, although certain levels of environmental disruption are intolerable for most organizations, internal meta-learning competences may provide an explanation that goes beyond mere luck for how some organizations manage to survive and even make a profit in very adverse circumstances.
Another important component of the environment is market conditions. This refers not only to competitors' competence; aggressiveness and power matter. Customers -e.g. if they are demanding, collaborative or they become competitors -and suppliers -e.g. if they are innovative and provide quality products -may also affect learning, because they influence knowledge sharing. The same can be said about industry standards and product ownership issues.
The general level of technological development of the society in which the organization operates is also very important: a high level of development is a stimulus to emulation, improvement and new product creation. Government regulations also play an important part, especially where bureaucracy is high or interventionist policies are implemented, which both have constraining effects on companies' field of action. On the other hand, one may find political contexts -such as young democracies, or countries undergoing reconstruction processes -in which, for different reasons, there is a remarkable absence of regulation in the field. This context may not be as favorable as it may seem at first sight, because it may open the door to a competition ruled by the law of the jungle, which includes a series of issues regarding monopoly, unfairness or ownership of technology and knowledge. Similarly, socio-political instability and adverse economic conditions are obstacles to learning, although in the case of the latter, there are examples of successful organizations that have been able to view economic recession as a good opportunity for learning and producing value through innovative solutions. The internal organizational environment may also cause difficulties to potential learners. Literature on the learning organization has dwelt extensively on the characteristics that an organization must have to enhance learning.
First of all, learning resources may be insufficient or they may not be available to all members of the organization. This results, for example, in deficient training for newcomers or in strategic areas, failing to create adequate structures for analyzing past experiences and experimenting in new areas, the impossibility of allocating time to these activities, and so on. A lack of control over resources, especially knowledge flows, may lead to imitation from competitors, with the consequent loss of competitive advantage. In this case, although the organization may learn, competitors also learn at its expense.
There are other obstacles related to the organization's cultural, structural and political traits. For instance, in excessively hierarchical and rigid organizations, excess control originates fear, mistrust and double-faced behavior. There are organizations that prevent learning from mistakes by penalizing them or their disclosure, with the result that their members perceive a lack of psychological safety. Tensions between organization members also lead to a failure to learn: competition for power, power abuse, misalignment between individuals and groups, among groups or with the organization are different foci of tension. In addition, different forms of political maneuvering may lead to different forms of information distortion, such as incompleteness, bias, censorship, and so on. Although some scholars advocate them as the ideal learning ground, organizations with a fluid, flat structure are not immune either from these problems, especially when they become larger, because their potential loss of clear reference points may lead to anarchy. Having a participative structure, with little hierarchy and a leadership based on moral authority rather than power does not mean that it is fluid. In any human organization, goals, reporting systems and fields of competence must be clear.
A particularly important issue is the misuse of IT and communication systems. The existence of these systems has no doubt revolutionized -and continues to do so -the business world. However, some seem still influenced by the overoptimistic expectations typical of the 1970s and 1980s, and fail to understand their function as learning tools or enablers, and appear to believe that capturing and collecting information in an IT system is the same as learning. 1 Even if this is not the case, choosing the wrong tool for the organization -e.g. a data-oriented system instead of a 'who-knows-what' approach -may be a serious hindrance. Indeed, the practical or tacit aspects of knowledge require face-to-face interaction and will never be replaced by a virtual handbook. Finally, the emergence of new communication technologies may lead to the paradox where, although these tools reduce time and spatial distances and help cost-cutting and knowledge-sharing, they place more pressure on individuals, who now become available 24/7 and must make multiple decisions in such short periods of time that their reflection and learning become impaired.
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Difficulties Specific to the Learning Process Itself
James G. March explored the different obstacles to learning along with Barbara Levitt (1988) and Daniel A. Levinthal (1993) . Their works have been considered classical pieces in the organizational learning literature, specifically in the area of learning by experience. While we do not pretend to be exhaustive, we consider that their reflections, combined with those of many other experts, may be illuminating for actual practice. We group all these problems in two main clusters: first, the source of learning, experience, may itself be flawed or imperfect; second, learning, as a cognitive process, is limited -or myopic -by nature.
Flaws in Experience
Experience is considered to be the most important source of learning. However, experience may be a poor teacher: the context is continuously changing; experiential learning involves sampling problems and issues related with memory and history interpretation.
We could start by talking about the sampling and data problems. First of all, we encounter the problem that experience very often leans on a small sample of previous occurrences from which it is difficult to generalize. In these cases, organizations usually introduce experimentation as the main way of compensating for the lack of experience. To be successful, experiments must comply with certain characteristics, such as control over variables, rigorous documentation, clear measurement criteria, clear learning objectives, a proper timing and low risk, among others. High-hazard organizations, which need to learn from very rare occurrences, cannot use experimentation because of safety reasons. Therefore, they use simulation and other related learning strategies (see Table 4 ). Sample scarcity is not the only challenge: sometimes, it is difficult to extract the essential from the background noise, and this difficulty is increased if, instead of a few events, we have a very large collection of data. This is not an original problem: for example, it is affecting modern Internet users. We are immersed in an information civilization whose main problem is not even the reliability of the sources but, first of all, capturing the essential amidst the incidental. These issues are related with organizational memory, of which we have talked before.
In the case of learning from others' experience, there may be a distance with respect to the source of experience. Although this problem may be solved with new communication systems, there are some important elements that may not be transferred in this manner, especially when tacit knowledge is involved. Note that here, when speaking of distance, it is not only geographical distance, but also cultural distance, or type of knowledge base.
In the third place, experience primarily remits to time. We use history as a basis for experience development, but history is always subject to interpretation and, hence, to interpretation frameworks. These frameworks may bias our own interpretation of facts: prevailing mindsets may blind sight to the point of denial of evidence. Interpretation frameworks are vulnerable to politics, which in turn originate processes of self-advocacy against evidence, and sticking to harmful practices. The situation may be worse if the frameworks used for interpretation are themselves hindering learning (e.g. a culture of control, lack of transparency, face-saving, mistrust, and so on). On the other hand, predicting the future simply by referring to the past is problematic in itself: assertions such as "it has never happened before so there is no reason that it will happen in the future", "we have always been successful in this, so we will have no problem in the future", or "we have never been able to overcome this problem, so there is no point in trying again" hide a form of delusion which Senge (1990) calls "delusion of learning from experience" and qualifies as a "learning disability". Note that these forms of delusion may appear even when past issues are subjected to statistical analysis. The key here is that successive events may be similar, but they are never a re-edition of the same event -the devil is in the details -, even if no unforeseen contingencies occur.
Moreover, learning from experience requires a clarification of what is considered a success. We have already mentioned the ambiguity of success: indicators of success and levels of aspiration may change over time, and are also dependent on the various internal subcultures. Finally, as we will see soon, what is considered a success in the short run may be a failure in the long run. What is success, then? How do we measure it?
Last but not least, there is the danger of superstitious learning. This consists of an erroneous causal attribution of certain outcomes to certain behaviors. Routines (mistakenly) associated with success will be consistently followed, and the ones associated with failure consistently changed. Once again, in the face of both success and failure, a rigorous analysis of causes is necessary.
All the above-mentioned problems may appear both when learning comes from one's own experience and when it comes from others' experience (known as vicarious learning). The only difference is that, in the latter case, imitation must not be mistaken for mere mimicry: what has been successful in other organizations may not be successful in one's own. Whether it is the adoption of new technologies, new practices or a new structure that have proven to be successful elsewhere, this process needs a very careful comparison and analysis of the similarities and differences between the source organization and the recipient.
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Shortcomings Inherent to Learning Itself
Myopia is described by Levinthal and March (1993) as a congenital trait of learning by experience. According to them, mechanisms of simplification and specialization lead to three limiting tendencies. These are: the tendency to ignore the long run, the tendency to ignore the larger picture, and the tendency to overlook failures.
Given that survival in the short run is a sine qua non for survival in the long run, organizations often focus on the former and ignore the latter. This behavior is at the basis of diverse problems which compromise the organization's survival in the long run: excessive specialization (at the expense of competitive advantage in the long run), power traps (typical of very powerful organizations that have shaped the environment), competency (or success) traps, and failure traps, all of them leading to the organization's inability to face new challenges or set new goals. The "not-invented-here" syndrome appears as a consequence of an excessive path dependency, and runs parallel to a self-reinforcing low aspiration-low investment in exploration cycle. When organizations concentrate on achieving excellence by developing certain specific competences, it is important that they avoid becoming trapped by their own search for success. With this aim in mind, Hurst (1995) proposes a series of steps to 'preemptively' create periodical crises in the organization.
The second myopia is that which leads to overlooking distant places. Specialization leads to focusing attention on certain components of the system at the expense of others. When learning only occurs in certain subunits of the organization and the rest of the organization piggybacks on the effort of a few -thus under-investing in exploration -, there is a decline in the overall level of knowledge developed by the organization and a downward spiral is generated. Decline is faster if there is no cross-learning between the different subunits. In conclusion, survival of certain components of the system does not guarantee survival of the whole system, just as survival of the organization does not guarantee survival of the economy and society or of the people in the organization. Excessively bureaucratic, control-focused, hierarchical regimes in organizations create the ideal milieu for parochialism, lack of information flow and self-defensive attitudes which in turn accelerate these learning dysfunctions.
The third myopia is the overlooking of failures. There are many mechanisms in organizations that may lead to this phenomenon. On one hand, acquiring competence not only may lead to competence traps, it also results in a self-assurance effect that makes learners increasingly rely on their expertise to the risk of exaggerating the likelihood of success. Social psychology studies coincide in that self-efficacy (the belief that agents have in the efficacy of their actions) is beneficial, but the dose of self-efficacy must be moderated by reality. Note that the process also works the other way: when success is very rare, there is the risk of becoming underconfident. On the other hand, policies that penalize failure (or failure disclosure) may force this myopia into the organization. This problem also includes the tendency to attribute success to one's own ability and failure to bad luck or others' incompetence.
In both cases, a very important part of learning from experience is blocked, namely, learning from failures. Given that both common sense and a large body of empirical data support this idea, it is surprising that most managerial and business literature directly addressed to practitioners focuses almost exclusively on personal and organizational success. Indeed, many scholars consider previous errors to be the spur of learning. The roots of this third myopia are to be found in different traits that have already been mentioned: a culture that punishes disclosure of negative issues, lack of trust, unwillingness to face complex problems, resistance to change, and so on. Cannon and Edmondson (2005) provide an interesting analysis of these technical and social barriers to the activities -identifying failure, analyzing failure and deliberate experimentation -that lead to learning from failure.
We should not conclude this subject without mentioning another interesting area that is often ignored, which is learning from quasi-errors, i.e. close calls. It is an interesting extension of the classical learning-from-experience that requires entering the territory of "what-might-havebeen" by using both reasoning and imagination. Thus, the same imagination that is crucial for product innovation is a sine qua non for framing hypothetical situations -in both better and worse scenarios -as richly as possible in order to improve performance. According to March et al. (1991) , this is one of the ways of compensating for the lack of samples, e.g. in high-hazard industries, in addition to a rich analysis of the extant -though scarce -historical records of catastrophes and the construction of entirely hypothetical cases.
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Shortcomings Inherent To Learning This paper would be incomplete if we overlooked a very important phase that must accompany most learning processes: unlearning. That is, in order to learn effectively, organizations must often eliminate previously acquired knowledge -including practices, basic assumptions, technical skills, and so on -that is not useful anymore, and that, if kept, could even become a hindrance.
Unlearning
Discerning which knowledge should be discarded and which kept is a crucial task for managers. Unlearning is a sort of intentional forgetting 2 that consists of "discarding obsolete and misleading knowledge" (Hedberg, 1981, p. 3) . This means that, in order to adopt new knowledge, practices or mindsets, it may be necessary to get rid of old routines, assumptions or cause-effect connections.
In order to fix certain imperfections or acquire new skills, i.e. for single-loop learning, a certain degree of unlearning is needed. Failing to unlearn at this level may lead to a deceleration of the learning process due to the emergence of discrepancies or misalignments of varying importance within the organization. However, the most difficult task is to discard basic assumptions when this is needed to undertake more radical changes (double-loop learning), because this requires unmasking and substituting those unnoticed root principles that are driving the organization. Failing to unlearn here will most probably result in a deeper failure: the old mindset will emerge, the problems addressed will appear again, and, therefore, the intended reformation will not take place, with a resulting waste of resources -economic, human, technical, and so onthat may be fatal for the organization.
If unlearning is needed for learning, conversely, experts highlight that it is important to find or, better, already have, a new substitute for unlearned knowledge in order to prevent the organization falling into a period of chaos-induced paralysis. In other words, no unlearning process should be undertaken without an ongoing process of new knowledge acquisition. This is because the longer this substitution process takes, the greater the risk of consuming all the slack resources available or becoming disoriented, especially when a complete upgrade is involved. On the other hand, the process needs to be complete; otherwise, new learning may remain partially ineffective due to the existence of competing forces.
What are the obstacles that must be removed in order to be successful in unlearning? In fact, they are the same as those existing for learning: resistance to change, power struggles, misjudgments of experience, and so forth. All of these issues have been addressed in part I.
Important as it is, not all unlearning is beneficial for the organization. For instance, although radical turnover of key personnel may sometimes be the fastest way of unlearning and introducing new knowledge, the general feeling of insecurity this situation originates within the organization may cause the process's failure. On the other hand, this unlearning-learning interplay takes place every time that new individuals enter the organization: they are socialized, i.e. they learn the ways of their new organization and unlearn others they brought with them, with the resulting danger of losing the distinctive knowledge for which they were hired. Another example: some new managers are so eager to distinguish themselves from their predecessors that they force the organization or part of it to unlearn and thus lose knowledge that was useful and effective. These forms of unwelcome unlearning must be carefully avoided.
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Problems Related to Unlearning -Incentivize innovation in all units of the organization -Avoid competency and other related traps (see Table 5) -Check for the organization's absorptive capacity (see Table 1 
Conclusion
As can be readily inferred, at the root of the obstacles to learning from previous conditions and to the learning process itself, there is not only or mostly a lack of technical knowledge base, but a series of counterproductive social relations, politics, organizational mechanisms and individual behaviors. The first difficulty that arises in removing these obstacles is an unawareness of their existence. Experts point out managers' impatience to meet targets, lack of time for reflection and adequate discussion, and lack of heed or attention due to this unawareness. If more attention is paid to these issues, it will be easier to uncover underlying politics, organizational automatisms and individual behaviors that may hinder learning.
In this paper, we have attempted to shed light on all of these issues in a structured way and provide solution lines for managers who wish to introduce or improve learning processes in their organization.
